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YuSMP Group Editorial Team Editorial team, YuSMP Group
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The short version

Patch vCenter to 8.0 U3m, 9.0.2.0200 or 9.1.1.0200 now, then check for SSO admin accounts you did not create. Broadcom lists no workaround, vCenter 7.0 had no public fix at release, and the patch doesn’t evict an attacker who already forged login tokens. If you aren’t sure which machines can reach your vCenter, a security audit of internal and external exposure is the quickest way to map it.

What is CVE-2026-123890?

CVE-2026-123890 lets an attacker who can reach vCenter over the network log in as administrator@vsphere.local without a password. The flaw sits in the VMware Directory Service, the identity store behind vCenter Single Sign-On.

Google’s write-up describes the root cause as a session key leak in the SRP-6a login exchange over DCE/RPC on TCP port 2012, the control interface of vCenter SSO. No user interaction is needed. Broadcom rates it critical at 9.8 and says there is no workaround.

The bug affects vCenter wherever it runs, including inside VMware Cloud Foundation, vSphere Foundation, Telco Cloud Platform and Telco Cloud Infrastructure.

vCenter lineStatus as of November 21, 2026
vCenter 9.1Fixed in 9.1.1.0200
vCenter 9.0Fixed in 9.0.2.0200
vCenter 8.0Fixed in 8.0 U3m; targeted by the attack tool
vCenter 7.0Targeted by the attack tool; no public patch at release; out of general support since October 2025
Cloud Foundation, vSphere Foundation, Telco CloudAffected through the bundled vCenter; follow VMSA-2026-0009

How did ARMORY CASTLE use the flaw?

ARMORY CASTLE reached vCenter from inside the network after breaking into an edge appliance, not directly from the internet. In the intrusion Mandiant investigated, the chain ran like this:

  1. Edge appliance. Initial access came through CVE-2026-102764, a separate zero-day in BeyondTrust Remote Support.
  2. Pivot. The attackers moved to an internal Linux appliance with no endpoint monitoring and escalated to root.
  3. vCenter takeover. A custom Go tool called BONESAW exploited CVE-2026-123890, copied the directory database, pulled out the SAML signing material and created a new SSO administrator.
  4. Persistence. A second tool, SAWSNAKE, used the stolen keys to forge SAML assertions for the administrator account, a Golden SAML attack that skips multi-factor authentication.
  5. Data. From there the group reached ESXi hosts and copied virtual machine data, using backdoors that included one controlled through the Slack API.

Google says BONESAW was compiled on July 13, 2026, and that the group has exploited edge appliances since 2023. Using a zero-day after the initial break-in is the new part. ARMORY CASTLE was previously tracked as UNC5221.

“Organizations should both apply the patches and examine their systems for evidence of compromise,” Mandiant CTO Charles Carmakal told SecurityWeek.

What it means for US & EU software teams

vCenter is the control plane for every virtual machine it manages. An attacker with SSO admin rights can snapshot a database server, clone a VM with application secrets, or switch off a host. Firewall rules inside the guest won’t stop any of that.

Teams that keep regulated fintech or healthtech workloads on vSphere for data residency or audit reasons are the most exposed.

For engineering and security leads, that changes three things.

  • Patching is not cleanup. A forged SAML token doesn’t need the bug at all. If an attacker exported the signing material before you patched, the door stays open until the signing certificate is replaced.
  • The weak point is the inside network. The attack came from a compromised appliance on the internal network. Network segmentation around management interfaces matters more here than the perimeter.
  • Reporting clocks may start. In the EU, a confirmed compromise of virtualization infrastructure can count as a significant incident under NIS2, which expects an early warning within 24 hours, and as a major ICT incident under DORA. In the US, PCI DSS 4.0 and SOC 2 auditors will ask when the critical patch was applied and what the compromise check found.

Teams still on vCenter 7.0 face the hardest call. The attack tool supports 7.x, no public patch existed at release, and the branch is out of general support. The realistic short-term answer is strict network isolation. Beyond that, plan an upgrade to 8.0 or later, or move the affected workloads elsewhere.

What should vSphere teams do this week?

  1. Patch. Move vCenter to 8.0 U3m, 9.0.2.0200 or 9.1.1.0200 and apply the rest of VMSA-2026-0009 to SDDC Manager and VMware Tools for Windows.
  2. Close the management ports. Allow TCP 2012 only between vCenter and its SSO peers, and TCP 443, 5480 and 22 only from admin jump hosts. Google published a VCSA hardening tool that sets these rules at the kernel level.
  3. Hunt for the known traces. Look for SSO administrators nobody requested, VAMI API calls that turn on SSH, files such as /tmp/123, /tmp/sss or /usr/bin/vmtoolscs, and outbound traffic from the appliance to Slack. Google’s report includes YARA rules and IP indicators.
  4. Assume token theft if you find anything. Replace the SSO signing certificate, rotate vCenter, database and service account credentials, and review ESXi hosts and recent VM exports.
  5. Patch the way in. Update BeyondTrust Remote Support and audit other remote access and edge appliances. Appliances that sit inside the network without endpoint monitoring made the pivot possible.
  6. Isolate vCenter 7.0. Restrict it to a management network now and put an upgrade date on the calendar.

Frequently asked questions

What is CVE-2026-123890?

CVE-2026-123890 is a critical authentication bypass in the VMware Directory Service of vCenter Server, rated CVSS 9.8. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to vCenter can obtain a session as administrator@vsphere.local. Broadcom fixed it in advisory VMSA-2026-0009 on November 19, 2026.

Which vCenter versions fix it?

The fixed builds named in coverage of the advisory are vCenter 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200 and 8.0 U3m. vCenter 7.0 is also targeted by the attack tool but had no public patch at release, and it left general support in October 2025. Broadcom lists no workaround.

Is CVE-2026-123890 being exploited?

Yes. Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group report that ARMORY CASTLE, a suspected Chinese state-sponsored group formerly tracked as UNC5221, exploited it from early September 2026, more than two months before the patch. CISA added it to the KEV catalog on November 20, 2026.

Does patching remove an attacker who already got in?

No. The attackers stole SAML signing material and forged login tokens, which keeps working after the patch and bypasses multi-factor authentication. Teams that find signs of compromise should replace the signing certificate, rotate vCenter and database credentials and review ESXi hosts.

How did the attackers reach vCenter?

In the case Mandiant investigated, initial access came through CVE-2026-102764, a zero-day in BeyondTrust Remote Support. The group then moved to an internal Linux appliance without endpoint monitoring, gained root and ran its BONESAW tool against vCenter from inside the network.

Sources

Broadcom — VMware Security Advisory VMSA-2026-0009 (primary source, November 19, 2026)
Google Threat Intelligence Group & Mandiant — ARMORY CASTLE Exploits vSphere (November 19, 2026)
CISA — CISA Adds Four Known Exploited Vulnerabilities to Catalog (November 20, 2026)
BleepingComputer — VMware patches vCenter zero-day exploited in attacks since September (November 19, 2026)
SecurityWeek — Newly Patched VMware vCenter Flaw Exploited as Zero-Day by Chinese APT (November 19, 2026)